Catholic University Law Review
Volume 2

Issue 2

Article 8

1952

Recent Cases
William F. Sondericker
John M. Kearney
Rosemarie Serino
Nancy-Nellis Warner
Henry J. Cappello

See next page for additional authors

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview

Recommended Citation
William F. Sondericker, John M. Kearney, Rosemarie Serino, Nancy-Nellis Warner, Henry J. Cappello, M.
Durkan Cannon, Andrew Codispoti, Harry Balfe II, William B. Kamenjar, Donald J. Letizia, John M.
Lothschuetz & Betty Ross, Recent Cases, 2 Cath. U. L. Rev. 112 (1952).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol2/iss2/8

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact edinger@law.edu.

Recent Cases
Authors
William F. Sondericker, John M. Kearney, Rosemarie Serino, Nancy-Nellis Warner, Henry J. Cappello, M.
Durkan Cannon, Andrew Codispoti, Harry Balfe II, William B. Kamenjar, Donald J. Letizia, John M.
Lothschuetz, and Betty Ross

This notes is available in Catholic University Law Review: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol2/iss2/8

RECENT C ASES
CONFLICT

OF LAWS-CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-FULL

FAITH AND

CREDIT-

FOR DIVORCE-Arthur married Florence in North Carolina but
shortly thereafter found Florence was the lawful wife of X. They agreed that
Arthur should pay part of the expenses and that Florence should go to Florida
to obtain a divorce from X. Florence had no intention to change her domicile,
but intended and did return to Virginia immediately after procuring the decree.
A few weeks later they remarried in Maryland. When marital difficulties
developed, Arthur brought suit in Vermont to have the two marriages declared
null and void, on the ground that the Florida court had no jurisdiction to render
a decree and that Florence's marriage to X was never terminated. Neither the
petitioner nor the record raised the question of whether or not the divorce
was contested by X. The Vermont court found that Florence had deceived
the Florida court as to her domicile and annulled the first marriage to Arthur. The
petition as to the second marriage was dismissed, but the Supreme Court of
Vermont reversed and held the second marriage also null and void. The
United States Supeme Court granted certiorari.
Held: That the Vermont
court could not deny full faith and credit to the Florida decree in a
collateral attack if no evidence was adduced by the assailant to overcome the
presumption of validity, thereby rendering the issue of jurisdiction res judicata.
Cook v.Cook, 341 U. S. 126 (1951).
JURISDICTION

It is settled that a decree is final everywhere when the court has made a
finding of domicile in a cause where the defendant has appeared generally,
or answered and had an opportunity to litigate that question. Sherrer v. Sherrer,
334 U. S. 343 (1948); Coe v. Coe, 334 U. S. 356 (1948); Davis v. Davis,
305 U. S. 32 (1938). Likewise, a stranger is precluded from attacking the
decree collaterally if the rendering state would not permit such attack under its
internal law, Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U. S. 581 (1950) ; for the principles
of res judicata are equally applicable to questions of jurisdiction over parties and
subject matter as they are to other issues. Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308
U. S. 66, 78 (1939) ; Baldwin v. Traveling Men's Assn., 283 U. S. 522 (1931).
In the same manner principles of estoppel may prevent a party who has procured
a divorce from later denying its validity in another forum. Krause v. Krause,
282 N. Y. 255, 26 N. E. 2d 290 (1940) ; Brown v. Brown, 242 App. Div. 33,
272 N. Y. 877 (4th Dep't 1934), aff'd. 266 N. Y. 522, 195 N. E. 186 (1935).
But a sister state is free to determine whether or not a bona fide domicile of one
party is established in an ex parte proceeding in another state rendering the
decree, Williams v. North Carolina II, 325 U. S. 226 (1945), although the
judgment on its face presumes competent jurisdiction. Titus v. Wallick, 306
U. S. 282 (1939); Adams v. Saenger, 303 U. S. 59 (1939); Esenwein v.
Commonwealth, 325 U. S. 279 (1945).
The decision in the Cook case, supra, has further extended these established
principles to give greater force and effect to the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
Now forum #2 must not only presume the validity of the foreign decree, but
it must further assume that it was rendered in a contested and not an ex parte
proceeding. The burden of showing that the decree was uncontested lies upon
the assailant unless the record contains the decree or a stipulation concerning it,
insofar as it reveals the nature of the proceeding. Cook v. Cook, supra.
The instant case points up the numerous problems confronting courts in
giving credit to foreign divorce decrees. A state now knows that a fraudulent

claim of domicile by the petitioner is not material to enforceability if the other
spouse has contested or appeared in the proceeding. Still a more paternal state
may question the applicability of the Full Faith and Credit Clause as a limitation
on its control over its citizens and their health, safety and morals. The basis for
this objection is that marriage is so interwoven with public policy that consent
of the parties to a divorce in another jurisdiction without a change of domicile
renders the decree impotent. Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14, 41 (1902).
Yet, a constitutional command permits the two consenting parties to temporarily
leave the state to escape the severity of its laws, obtain a migratory divorce in
a "divorce mill" state, and then return with a decree which the interested state
must recognize, though it was never represented. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting,
Sherrer v. Sherrer, supra at 356, 361; Coe v. Coe, supra at 378. It is true that
when the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties the
judgment is valid everywhere, even though it was rendered on a cause plainly
contrary to the public policy of a second forum. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 310 U. S.
230 (1908). But from an analytical standpoint a sister state should not be bound
to recognize a decree affecting the marital status when the essential nexus
between the res and the court is lacking. Bell v. Bell, 181 U. S. 175 (1901).
Without jurisdiction to divorce, there can be no divorce. Cook v. Cook, supra,
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting at 130; and such a judgment is not entitled to
the full faith and credit which the Constitution of the United States demands.
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 34, 40-41 (1940) ; Williams v. North Carolina, supra
at 229
From an empirical viewpoint it appears that domicile as a jurisdictional factor
in divorce actions has been reduced to mere form. This essential has been
justifiably disregarded on the basis of the academic and social desirability for
certainty in the law. Williams v. North Carolina, supra at 227, 230; Justice
Holmes, dissenting, Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 628 (1906). Whether
or not domicile in the forum should have any significance except for the statutory
residence requirement of the state is open for inquiry since departure from this
standard would meet no constitutional objection. It is only formally required in
an international sense. Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier, [1895] A. C. 517 (P. C.).
It is submitted, however, that as long as bona fide domicile remains as a
jurisdictional prerequisite to divorce, it should not be circumvented by a constitutional rationalization. The zeal to reach a desired result should not be obtained
at the expense of exposing our legal system to the evils of judicial legislation.
WILLIAM F. SONDERICKER
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-COMMUNITY

PROPERTY

ABSENCE OF VALID MARRIAGE-EQUITY-DIVISION

IN

OF

WASHINGTON

STATE-

PROPERTY.-Respondent

and appellant lived together without the formality of a marriage ceremony.
Differences arose and action was brought to determine respective interests in
considerable real estate and personal property acquired during their meretricious
cohabitation. Respondent contended that she believed her prior marriage had
been dissolved by divorce and that the subsequent marriage was valid under the
common law, although not recognized in the State of Washington.
The court held that it was immaterial whether either of these parties believed they were validly married. Despite the essential community property
requirement of a valid marriage, the court determined that the authority and

jurisdiction of the court to divide the property accumulated during such a relationship was in consequence of inherent equity powers. The court divided the
real property on an equitable basis. With reference to the personal property,
respondent was permitted to recover on the "innocent party" theory. Poole v.
Schrichte, 236 P. 2d 1044 (Wash. 1951).
Both parties relied upon rules laid down in a recent decision, Creasman v.
Boyle, 31 Wash. 2d 345, 196 P. 2d 835 (1948), wherein the court declared that
property acquired by a man and woman, not married to each other but living
together as husband and wife, is not community property and, in the absence
of a trust relationship, belongs to the one in whose name legal title is held.
In the principal case the court clarified and added to Creasman v. 'Boyle, supra,
by reiterating that even though there be no lawful marriage between the parties,
"... yet if either or both of them in good faith enter into a marriage with

the other, or with each other, and such marriage proves to be void, a court
of equity will protect the innocent party in the property accumulated by the
joint efforts of both;"
The court further differentiated Creasman v. Boyle, supra, citing that one of
the parties therein had died, leaving no way to determine intent, the other party
being forbidden under the "dead man's statute" from testifying. The rights
of the respondent did not stem from any alleged marriage relationship, but from
the fact that she had contributed proceeds of money and time which constituted
a larger portion than that of appellant; therefore, distribution was effected under
the community property system in accordance with equitable principles.
The principal case reveals aspects of the basic structure involved in the
extremely complicated community property system. All property earned by
husband or wife during their marriage is presumed to be community property,
except that acquired by gift or inheritance; community property includes income
earned as the result of a sale of community property or income from the community property. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Garrison, 13 Wash. 2d 170, 124
P. 2d 939 (1942).
Any obligation on a note signed by either spouse during marriage is an
indebtedness shared by the wife, regardless of knowledge, if used for community purposes. Fies v. Storey, 37 Wash. 2d 105, 221 P. 2d 1031 (1950). The
ultimate test applied by the courts is whether or not the obligation was intended
to be used for the benefit of the community. Fies v. Storey, supra. However,
property owned by either spouse prior to the marriage belongs to him or her
separately, as does property acquired by gift, inheritance, devise after betroth,
or income from separate property. It is necessary to clearly establish evidence of
separate property, for all property is presumed to be community until shown to be
separate. Berol v. Berol. 37 Wash. 2d 380, 223 P. 2d 1055 (1950). The rule
is well settled in Washington State that status of property as community or
separate is determined as of the date acquired; if separate when acquired, it
will remain such as long as it can be traced and identified; and, further, that its
rents, issues and profits will remain separate. Burch v. Rice, 37 Wash. 2d 185,
222 P. 2d 847 (1950). Either spouse has full power to convey or devise his
or her separate property. Rem. Rev. Stat. §6890. Since Washington State has
abolished curtesy and dower, there is no need to speak of waiving the will and
taking a statutory forced share in the separate property. Rem. Rev. Star §1341.
A spouse may do as he or she pleases with their respective separate property.
Such is not the case with community property. A spouse can devise only his

or her half of the community, but no more.

McKnight v. Basilides, 19 Wash.

2d 391, 143 P. 2d 307 (1943) ; Rem. Rev. Stat §1342 (Wash. 1932) ; de Funiak,

Principles of Community Property §199 (1943); McKay, Community Property,
§1383 (1925). On intestacy, the community property of one-half interest passes
to the survivor or survivors to the exclusion of collateral heirs, subject to the
community debts and expenses of administration. Rem. Rev. Stat. §1342.
We have seen in our principal case, Poole v. Schrichte, supra, how the
Washington State courts have expanded the community property system. Whereas
the doctrine involved is not entirely new, it is a clarification that there is no rule
of law or equity which says that the respondent forfeits her interests by living with
a man during an invalid marriage. Respondent's rights arise out of her property
rights, not from the invalid marriage. In the words of the court:
In an equity case, the trial is de novo in this court, and, although the trial
court's findings are given great weight, we do, so far as necessary, make our
own findings and draw our own conclusions, and certainly we are not bound
to perpetuate error.

JOHN M. KEARNEY
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-HUSBAND DENIED RIGHT TO EVICT MOTHER-IN-LAW
FROM PROPERTY JOINTLY HELD WITH HIS WIFE.-"So far as diligent search

reveals, .

.

.the first recorded case where one seeks legally to evict a mother-in-

law" is Fine v. Scheinhaus, 109 N. Y. S. 2d 307 (1952). Here a husband sued
in ejectment to evict his mother-in-law from a dwelling owned by the plaintiffhusband and his wife as tenants by entirety.
The Supreme Court of New York, Special Term for Motions, held that
(1) the wife is legally entitled to permit her mother to share possession with
her because both husband and wife are entitled to possession of the dwelling
house owned by them as tenants by entirety, and that (2) the husband has no
right, as head of the family, to dispossess his mother-in-law in the absence of
proof that the wife granted the husband sole right to the possession of the house.
Prior to 1848, a husband was "lord of his castle" and had the legal right
to eject whoever was distasteful to him. By jure mariti the right was conferred
upon him to possess his wife's lands and occupy them, because possession of
land by husband and wife was presumptively the possession of the husband.
Moreover, the husband could divest the wife of possession during his life because
he had full control of the property held by the entirety. Since the enactment
of legislation in 1848-1860 (Married Women's Acts, Chap. 200, Laws of 1848,
Chap. 375, Laws of 1849, Chap. 90, Laws of 1860) the husband has been
deprived of his common law right to the possession of and control over the
wife's property. The wife has been given equal right of possession with her
husband of real estate held by both as tenants by entirety. The essential
characteristic of such an estate by entirety is that each spouse is seized of the
whole-per tout et non per my--and not of a share, divisible part or moiety.
Palmer v. Mansfield, 222 Mass. 263, 110 N. E. 283 (1915).

Where property is conveyed to husband and wife as tenants by entirety,
the title is inseverable. They are co-owners by virtue of this title acquired
after marriage. Vasilion v. Vasilion, 192 Va. 735, 66 S.E. 2d 599 (1951).
Husband and wife during joint lives are entitled to joint possession, enjoyment
and control. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Hart, 106 F. 2d 269

(3rd Cir. 1939). A husband may not divest a wife's rights in property without
her assent. Gasner v. Pierce, 286 Pa. 529, 134 A. 494 (1926).

Only when

a husband acquires full power over the property by survivorship or is granted sole
possession by the wife, may the husband do as he pleases against the wishes of
the other spouse. Fairclaw v. Forrest, 76 U. S. App. D. C. 197, 130 F. 2d 829

(1942). Since in the instant case there was no claim that the wife ever granted sole
right of possession of the dwelling to her husband, the plaintiff had no right to
dispossess his mother-i-n-law.
In the case at bar, the crucial question is: was the plaintiff denied
possession? His suit in ejectment to evict his mother-in-law could not succeed
without proving, either actually or inferentially, that the defendant ousted the
plaintiff from possession. New York Civil Practice Act, §1004. Finnegan v.
Humes, 277 N. Y. 682, 14 N. E. 2d 389 (1938). Defendant claimed that the
wife had "not withheld possession of said premises from said plaintiff at any
time" and the court held that the plaintiff had not been dispossessed. Thus
the plaintiff could -not succeed in an action for ejectment.
Justice Searl remarked in the principal case that the only reasonable solution
was apparently one of "give and take."
If each one could place himself or herself in the position of the other and

accord the same treatment, respect, and privileges as would be desired under
the same circumstances, home life would be much happier and the limited
days of life granted us by the Creator pass more pleasantly.
In deciding the case, the court failed to take judicial notice of the principle
that a husband is the head of his family. A single controlling head is necessary
for the unity and preservation of the family, and the husband is that head.
Cassidy v. Constantine, 269 Mass. 56, 168 N. E. 169 (1929). The Married
Women's Acts do not divest the husband of his rights as head of the family.
Coleman v. Burr, 93 N. Y. 17, 45 Am. Rep. 160 (1883). It is true that under
these Acts a woman is given equality of legal personality. But they do not destroy
a husband's rights to direct family affairs, Brewer v. Brewer, 79 Neb. 726,
113 N. W. 161 (1907) and to determine where and what the home of the
family shall be. Atkins v. Atkins, 253 Ala. 43, 42 So. 2d 650 (1949).
When two persons marry, a new family is formed and new obligations
and duties arise. If in conflict with former obligations and duties, the new
obligations and duties of the husband and wife are more important. As noted in
the case of Spaiford vi. Spafford, 199 Ala. 300, 74 So. 354 (1917), conjugal duties
are paramount and in keeping with the Biblical statement:
God made them male and female. For this cause a man shall leave his father
and mother, and shall cleave to his wife. And they two shall be in one flesh.
(Mark, X, 6-8)
By analogy, it would seem to be the concomitant duty of the wife to leave her
father and mother and cleave to her husband. Filial duty is commendable but
it must not supersede conjugal duty. In the leading case of Brewer v. Brewer,
79 Neb. 726, 113 N. W. 161 (1907), the Court said:
The family is the unit of the social organism, and, while the institution of
new families to some extent involves the disintegration of the older household,
it is absolutely necessary to the continued social existence. When a man
marries and founds a new family, he assumes new duties and obligations; and,
when these conflicts with her former ties, they must be held paramount. The
very existence of the family depends upon the enforcement of the principle.

This has even been held true where a spouse was an infant. McWhorter v. Gibson,
19 Tenn. App. 152, 84 S. W. 2d 108 (1935).
It would appear that the case was decided on a technicality, viz., could the
plaintiff prove, either actually or inferentially, that the defendant ousted the
plaintiff from possession. There were no arguments by the defendant that the
mother-in-law, if ejected, would be thereby subjected to the privation of physical
necessities. It is a generally recognized rule that the duty of a husband is to
rovide a home-a home wherein the wife is free from unwarranted interference
rom the members of his family. Salyer v. Salyer, 303 Ky. 653, 198 S. W. 2d 980
(1947).
Similarly, it would seem equitable, when there are no indications
that the parent would be in physical need if ejected, that a husband should be
free from unwarranted interference from members of his wife's family.
ROSEMARIE SERINO
NANCY-NELLIS WARNER
EXTRADITION-REFUSAL TO DELIVER PERSON CONVICTED UNDER LAWS OF
ANOTHER STATE WHO WAS NOT WITHIN STATE AT TIME OFFENSE ALLEGED.-

Petitioner's wife sued him in 1947 in the District of Columbia for separate
maintenance for herself and three children. The decree of the court, as subsequently modified, required him to pay $30 each two weeks for the support of
his minor children. After entry of the original decree, his wife took the three
children to North Carolina, where they have since remained. The petitioner
remained in the District of Columbia until May 1, 1950 when he went to North
Carolina to attend the funeral of a close relative. Upon arrival he was taken
into custody on a warrant of arrest based upon his wife's complaint sworn to
by her on April 29, 1950, alleging that he abandoned her and his children on
March 1, 1950, and had since failed and refused to provide for their support in
violation of North Carolina laws G. S. 14-322.
Immediately following his arrest the petitioner was taken before the Domestic Relations Court of the City of Charlotte and Mecklenburg County, where
on a plea of guilty he was sentenced to two years imprisonment in the county
jail, assigned to work on the roads. Sentence was suspended on condition that
he pay into court immediately $50, and each two weeks subsequently $40, said
payments to be applied to the support of his wife and children, and to be credited
on the order of the District of Columbia. He was permitted to return to the
District of Columbia. About a month later a capias instanter was issued by the
clerk of the Domestic Relations Court for violating the order regarding payments. This could not be executed because the petitioner was then in the District
of Columbia. The Governor of North Carolina, upon request of the local prosecutor, issued a requisition to the District of Columbia. Upon receipt, the District Judge (who acts as chief executive in requisition cases in the District of
Columbia) issued a fugitive warrant for the petitioner. On the same day, the
petitioner (Fowler) was arrested and delivered to the North Carolina Agent
(Ross), the order of the judge reciting that he was "satisfied, after a hearing
duly had, that the prisoner is the identical person mentioned in the said requisition."
Thereupon, the petitioner petitioned the District Court to grant him a writ of
habeas corpus. After a hearing in which the entire history of the case was brought
to the attention of the court, it was held that the petitioner was a fugitive from
North Carolina, that he is still under sentence of a North Carolina court on a
charge of non-support, and that therefore, as a matter of law, the petitioner

must be returned to that State to complete his sentence. This appeal from the denial
of the writ of habeas corpus followed. Fowler v. Ross, No. 10,850, D. C. Cir.
March 27, 1952.
The U. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the
decision of the District Court and ordered the release of the petitioner, holding
that the affidavit of the petitioner's wife did not charge the commission of the
crime on May 1, 1950, but on March 1, 1950, and since the uncontradicted
facts indicate that at that time the petitioner was not in North Carolina, no
offense was committed under the North Carolina Statute. To substantiate its
position, the court cited several North Carolina cases holding that the statute
requires that both elements of the offense, abandonment and non-support, must
occur in North Carolina. To the contention that the offense is a continuing
one, the court answered that the failure to allege in the complaint that abandonment
had occurred within the state of North Carolina vitiated the proceeding in the
North Carolina Court. The court further held that any complaint charging a
crime in futuro is bad on its face.
The controlling principle is stated by the court to be that a warrant of
requisition by a Governor is but prima facie sufficient to hold the accused. Where
the uncontradicted testimony of the accused together with the stipulation of
counsel as to the facts shows that the accused was not present within the state
at the time of the commission of the crime charged, he cannot be said to be
a fugitive from justice within the meaning of section 5278, Rev. Stat. (now
Title 18, §3182, U. S. Code, Supp. 1951) citing Hyatt v. People etc. ex rel
Corkran, 188 U. S. 691 (1903).
In a dissenting opinion, Circuit Judge Washington refutes the majority's
view of the Corkran case, supra. He states that the dictum of the Supreme Court
in that case should no be "taken with absolute literalness" in "that unless the
relator was within the demanding state at the time the crime was committed
he cannot under any circumstances be extradited. The . . . case simply does
not stand for that proposition." He distinguished the Fowler case from the
Corkran case on the fact that Corkran had never been within the state-for
trial or other purposes. He contends that where, as here, the relator is arrested,
tried and convicted in North Carolina, he is "a fugitive from justice of that
state in the fullest constitutional and statutory sense." Fowler v. Ross, supra
at pp. 21-24.
This case is concerned with a peculiar aspect of criminal law, extradition
between states (or more properly, rendition), which is controlled by provisions
of the U. S. Constitution (Art. IV, Sect. 2, Cl. 2) and implementing legisla
tion enacted by the Congress (Title 18, §3182, U. S. Code, Supp. 1951). To
that extent it is sui generis, State v. Quigg, 91 Fla. 197, 107 So. 409 (1926).
In the ordinary case where rendition is sought of a person accused of a crime
the test applied by the majority in the Fowler case, requiring a showing that
the person sought actually was in the demanding state at the time of the alleged
crime, seems proper. But where the person sought has actually been convicted
of a crime, and has escaped from prison, or violated his parole or the terms
of a suspended sentence, additional factors come into play. Where the judg(or the District of Columbia), Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U. S. 216, 227, 228
ment of a sister State is involved in a proceeding before a court of a State
(1934) the U. S. Constitution commands that "Full Faith and Credit shall be
given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of
every other State." Art. IV, Sect. 1.

The requirement of "full faith and credit" is not normally associated with
criminal proceedings. Commonwealth v. Green, 17 Mass. 515, 546 (1822).
It has become an axiom of conflict of laws that "one state does not enforce
the penal laws of another." Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657 (1892). This
rule has developed from the time honored refusal of courts generally to award
a money judgment on a cause of action based either on a penal award of damages in a civil suit, or a fine in a criminal suit by the courts of another state.
But in the case of extradition proceedings based on a conviction in another
state, it cannot properly be said that the court is "enforcing" the penal laws
of the other state. It is merely complying with the mandate of the Constitution
by delivering up a fugitive from justice. The Constitution imposes a duty
upon the executive authority of the State in which a fugitive has taken refuge
to cause his surrender upon proper demand by the executive authority of the
State from which he fled. If the governor of a State refuses to discharge his
duty to surrender such a fugitive, there is no way to compel him, Kentucky v.
Dennison, 24 How. 66 (1860), but no such discretion to arbitrarily refuse
to perform this duty vests in a District Judge acting in an analogous capacity
in the District of Columbia. The court at this stage has no right to inquire into
the merits of the system of justice which the other State has set up; if it is
to comply with the Constitutional requirement and accord "full faith and credit"
to all judicial proceedings, it must follow the rule that the judgments of a State
are subject to collateral attack in the courts of another State only on the ground
that they were entered by a court which lacked jurisdiction of the parties or of
the subject matter. Huntington v. Attrill, supra, at p. 685. The obligation of
the executive of the State to which a fugitive from justice has fled, to deliver
him to the demanding state, exists without any reference to the character of the
crime charged or to the policy or laws of the former state. Kentucky v. Dennison, supra, at p. 103.
Where extradition of an escaped convict or parole violator is sought the
facts upon which the requisition of the governor is based should not be required to conform to the "technical" requirement of the Statute, (Title 18,
§3182, U. S. Code, Supp. 1951), viz. the production of "a copy of an indictment or an affidavit made before a magistrate." The record of conviction of
such person is more than ample proof of an adequate indictment or affidavit
charging a crime.
It is clear that, in enunciating a general proposition, there was no intention
of excluding or exempting convicted escaped persons from liability to
extradition. No narrow or strained construction should be placed upon the
word "charged" as used in the Constitution and in the Federal Statute. It
is broad enough to include all classes of persons duly accused of crime. A
person can be said to be "charged" with a crime as well after his conviction
as before. The conviction simply establishes the charge conclusively. An
unsatisfied judgment of conviction still constitutes a "charge" within the
true meaning of the Constitution. An indictment or affidavit merely presents
the charge, while a conviction proves it. To warrant extradition the statute
requires an indictment or affidavit charging a crime, but if, in addition thereto,
there is also presented a record of conviction the case is not weakened, but
rather strengthened.
In re Hope, 7 N. Y. Crim. Rep 406, 10 N. Y. S. 28, 29 (1889); and see
Hughes v. Pflanz, 138 Fed. 980 (6th Cir. 1905), and note 78 A. L. R. 419
(1932).

The logical application of the doctrine of "exhaustion of remedies." Gusik
v. Schilder, 340 U. S. 132 (1950), to the instant case, requires that the court
in its hearing confine itself to the immediate issue of extradition, and under

the mandate of "full faith and credit" even more narrowly to the issue whether
the North Carolina court had jurisdiction over the person and subject matter.
Jurisdiction is a matter of power and covers right as well as wrong decisions.
Lamar v. United States, 240 U. S. 60, 64 (1916) ; Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S.
230, 234 (1908). If the judgment of the North Carolina court was erroneous
on the law or the facts, the defendant is required to exhaust his remedies by
way of appeal before any court can entertain habeas corpus proceedings. Accordingly insofar as the Court of Appeals has based its reversal of the Fowler
case on the merits of the North Carolina judgment rather than the North
Carolina court's lack of jurisdiction to hear the cause, its decision seems clearly
erroneous. State ex rel Rinne v. Garber, 111 Minn. 132, 126 N. W. 482
(1910).
Admittedly, as pointed out in the dissenting opinion, sentencing him to a
term of two years in a "chain gang" may be a very poor way of forcing the
petitioner to support his family, but no court can justify using a "hard case to
make bad law." The ramifications of this case in obstructing the enforcement
of criminal law are very great. Carried to its logical conclusion, this decision
would require a retrial on the merits of every case where the extraditee claims he
was not present when the crime was committed. With the difficulty of assembling witnesses and other similar hardships, a large number of escaped prisoners
and parole violators would escape reconfinement.

HENRY J. CAPPELLO

FEDERAL PROCEDURE-RULE 34, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE-GOOD
CAUSE-PRIVILEGED DOCUMENTS-FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT.-Three civilian

electronic engineers, employed by a private organization, acted as observers on an
experimental test flight of a United States Air Force B-29. The plane crashed killing all three civilian employees. The widows of the deceased civilian employees
instituted suit for damages, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, in the United
States District Court for the wrongful deaths of the deceased. The United States
filed answers making general denials. The plaintiffs, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
34, moved for the production of statements made by the survivors and an official
investigation report made by the Air Force. The United States refused to produce
the documents alleging that they were classified information and privileged.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, affirmed the lower court's
decision that, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 (b) (ii), negligence was deemed
to have been established against the United States for failure to produce the
statements and report. The court reasoned that in accordance with Rule 34,
good cause had been shown for the production of the documents which the
plaintiffs asked the United States to produce, that the statements and report
were not privileged and that any claim of privilege by the government was
for the determination of the court. Reynolds v. United States, 192 F. 2d 987
(3rd Cir. 1951), cert. granted 20 U. S. L. Week 3266 (April 7, 1952).
The principal case presents the question whether, pursuant to Rule 34,
good cause exists for the production and inspection of documents under the
above circumstances and whether a judge may properly order classified information
of a military nature bared in court as non-privileged matter.

Rule 34 Fed. R. Civ. P., requires that a party moving for the production
and inspection of documents must show "good cause" why such an order should
issue from the court. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U. S. 495 (1947); Alltmont
v. United States, 177 F. 2d 971 (3rd Cir. 1949). No degree of certainty
exists as to what is meant by the term good cause. William 4. Meier Glass Co.
v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 11 F. R. D. 487 (W. D. Pa. 1951). A bare
conclusion or assertion is not sufficient good cause under Rule 34. Radtke Patents
Corp v. Rabinowitz, 1 F. R. D. 126 (W. D. N. Y. 1940); Gebhard v.
Isbrandtsen, 10 F. R. D. 119 (S. D. N. Y. 1950). However, it has been deemed
that good cause has been shown if it specifically appears that the documents are
relevant to the subject matter of the action, United States v. Schine Chain
Theatres, 2 F. R. D. 425 (W. D. N. Y. 1942); that they may contain evidence
material to the issue, Hirshhorn v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 8 F. R. D. 11
(W. D. Pa. 1948) ; that impossibility or difficulty of access to witness exists or
a refusal to respond to requests for information on the need of such statements
for impeachment purposes, Morrone v. Southern Pacific Co., 7 F. R. D. 214
(S. D. Cal. 1947); Dusha v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 10 F. R. D. 150 (N. D.
Ohio 1950) ; that the information was taken on the spot and unavailable to the
other party due to his physical incapacity, Newell v. Capital Transit Co., 7
F. R. D 732 (D. D. C. 1948); DeBruce v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 6 F. R. D. 403
(E. D. Pa. 1947) ; that the sources of information were within the complete
control of the opposing litigant, Evans v. United States, 10 F. R. D. 255 (W. D.
La. 1950). But cf. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Reynolds, 176 F. 2d 476 (App. D. C.
1949), wherein good cause was not shown for the production of the plaintiff's
own statements made to an attorney for defendant's insurer investigating the
accident before plaintiff was represented by counsel.
In Williams A. Meier Glass Co. v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., supra,
in discussing the considerations which will show good cause the court suggests
the following test:
"These [considerations] include practical convenience, necessity of the moving
party in preparation of his case, facilitation of proof at the trial of the action,
and aid in the progress of the trial."

In Dulansky v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Electric Co., 10 F. R. D. 146 (S. D. Iowa
1950)

the court in considering good cause for the production of documents

pithily states that good cause consists in the "reasoning why their production is
called for."
The principal case combines both of the above criteria and holds that
"special circumstances make it essential to the preparation of the party's case
to see and copy the documents" since the "instrumentality involved in an
accident was within the exclusive possession and control of the defendant," and
the statements made by the survivors immediately after the crash when the
events were fresh in their minds were of unique and vital importance to the
plaintiff's case.
Sovereign immunity from liability in a civil tort action has been removed
by the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. §1346(b), §2671-2680 (Supp. 1951):
"The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title
relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private
individual under like circumstances . . ."
By this enactment Congress has declared that public interest will best be served
by placing the United States on a par with any other tortfeasor. Consenting to
be sued and be made defendant in a civil tort action, the United States has

submitted itself to the procedural requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Wunderly v. United States, 8 F. R. D. 356 (E. D. Pa. 1948). Being
a defendant in a civil tort action, the United States is subject to those provisions
of discovery of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as any other defendant.
Evans v. United States, supra.
Rule 34 excludes from discovery information which is privileged. Privilege
in respect to governmental matters arises out of sovereignty and is twofold:
1. sovereign common law privilege,
2. sovereign immunity based on public policy.
Sovereign common law privilege pertains to state secrets of national interest
and security-military and diplomatic. Zimmerman v. Poindexter, 74 F. Supp.
933 (D. Hawaii 1947). When information is unequivocally a state secret the
courts freely grant it absolute exclusion from discovery. Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., 26 F. Supp. 583 (E. D. N. Y. 1939).
Sovereign immunity based on public policy has rendered confidential information in the administration of government privileged in order to better promote
public interest. This privilege has arisen through the express statutory enactments
of Congress and through the directives of the heads of the various agencies of
government under authority of R. S. 161 (1875), 5 U. S. C. 22 (1946). The
urpose of such statutes and directives has been to promote the public interest
y keeping secret proceedings in certain governmental matters and in permitting
governmental "house-keeping" records to be free from discovery. Boske v.
Comingore, 177 U. S. 459 (1900).
Statutory enactments of sovereign immunity from discovery of specific matters
are declaratory of the public interest and render such matters privileged. These
are binding on the courts as law. Irvine v. Safeway Trails, Inc., 10 F. R. D.
586 (E. D. Pa. 1950). Directives of agency heads, regarding the privilege
to be enjoyed by matters within the agency's official control, are not declaratory
of public interest as are statutes, but are concerned chiefly with departmental
organization. Immunity from discovery in these matters has found effectiveness
in the government's inability to be made a party to a tort action. Zimmermann v.
Poindexter,suprg.
Privilege arising out of sovereign immunity based on public policy is not
as broad as that accorded sovereign common law privilege, but is ambulatory
and subject to the legislative will. The legislative will, within constitutional
limits, may extend, modify or divest the government of its privilege. Bank Line,
Limited, v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 801 (S. D. N. Y. 1948). The Federal Tort
Claims Act, supra, in making the United States amenable for its torts, is a
declaration of Congress based on public interest. That declaration neither
restricts nor limits the United States in regard to the discovery provisions of
Rule 34, and abolishes all privilege except common law privilege and statutory
privilege.
As a party moving for the production of documents must make a showing
of good cause, so too must the government make a showing of privilege in order
to withhold documents from discovery. Crosby v. Pacific S. S. Lines, Ltd., 133
F. 2d 470 (9th Cir. 1943). The showing of privilege, as in good cause, must
not be a bare conclusion or assertion, but must be a specific showing that the
alleged privileged matter falls within statutory privilege or common law privilege
involving the national security. This view has cogently been stated in Cresmer
v. United States, 9 F. R. D. 203, 204 (E. D. N. Y. 1949), in which the court
ordered an alleged privileged report by a Navy Board of Investigation produced
as not within common law privilege:

"In the absence of a showing of a war secret, or secret in respect to
munitions of war, or any secret appliance used by the armed forces or any
threat to the national security."
Classified information has been defined, 14 F. R. 7313, 32 C. F. R. §505.1:
"Definition-(a) Classified Matler. Information or material in any form or
any nature which in the public interest must be safeguarded in the manner
and to the extent required by its importance."

The term classified matter includes top secret, secret, confidential and restricted
information. These comprise both state secrets and "housekeeping" records.
As a result of the Federal Tort Claims Act abolishing all privilege, except
common law privilege and statutory privilege, the assertion that information is
'classified and thereby privileged cannot be substantiated without a further showing
that it concerns the national security and falls within common law privilege.
In the principal case, classified information is categorized as military information which is not privileged unless a specific showing is made that it contains
information affecting the national security and thereby is within common law
privilege.
Although due deference will be extended to an agency's determination of
matters wholly within the realm of state secrets, the ultimate decision in view
of specific cases and controversies, rests within judicial review. Likewise when
cases arise in which state secrets and other information are intermingled, it is the
duty of the court, under Rule 30(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., to peruse such information
in camera or to conduct an ex parte hearing and issue an order conducive to
justice in making available that which is not privileged and protecting that
which is privileged. Evans v. United States, supra at 257; Cresmer v. United
States, supra at 204; Zimmerman v. Poindexter, supra at 936; United States v.
Cotton Valley Operators Committee, 9 F. R. D. 719-721 (W. D. La. 1949), aff'd.
by an equally divided court, 339 U. S. 940 (1950).
In summation, the principal case follows previous case authority on the
showing of good cause under Rule 34, Fed. R. Civ. P., for the production of
documents. However, the case invokes a novel, but judicially sound, principle that
a broad claim of privilege by an agency of the government, unless first determined
by judicial review, is unavailing.
M. DURKAN CANNON
INTERNATIONAL
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THE

ENEMY ACT,.-Petitioner instituted suit under Sec. 9(a) of the Trading with the
Enemy Act, 40 Stat. 417 (1917), 50 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (Supp. 1951), to recover
property vested by the Alien Property Custodian. He alleged that: He is a
German citizen who lived in Hawaii continuously from 1876 to 1938. In 1938,
he took his family to Germany for a vacation. After the outbreak of war, he was
unable to secure passage home before 1940 when his reentry permit expired.
When the United States entered the war he was detained involuntarily, first by
the Germans and later by the Russians until 1949, when he returned to this
country. He had done nothing to aid the war effort of the enemy
HELD: 1. Petitioner was not a resident in Germany within the meaning of
the definition "enemy" in Sec. 2, and was entitled to bring suit under Sec. 9(a)
authorizing a suit by any person not an enemy to recover property vested by the
Alien Property Custodian.

2. Construed in the light of its legislative history and constitutional issues
which otherwise would be raised, Sec. 39, forbidding the return of property of
any national of Germany or Japan vested in the Government after December
1941, applies to those German and Japanese nationals otherwise ineligible to
bring suit under Sec. 9(a). Guessefeldt v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 308 (1952).
The purpose of the Trading with the Enemy Act, Supra, was to deprive the
enemy from using for its own purposes any property which it owned and controlled in the United States and to make the same property available for defense
and support of the United States. Clark v. Continental National Bank of Lincoln,
88 F. Supp. 324 (D. Neb. 1950). See Bishop, judicial Construction of the
Trading with the Enemy Act, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 721 (1949); Lourie, The Trading
with the Enemy Act, 42 Mich. L. Rev. 205 (1943).
The first question to be decided was whether the petitioner was a resident
within the territory of a nation at war with the United States within the meaning
of Sections 2 and 9(a) of the Trading with the Enemy Act.
Under Sec. 2 of the Trading with the Enemy Act, supra, alien enemy is
defined as a person residing in an enemy country. However, it does not include
a temporary sojourn. Stadtmuller v.Miller, 11 F.2d 732 (2nd Cir. 1926). In
order to effect a change in residence there must be an intention to abandon the
old and the intention to remain in the new domicile and the change in residence
must be voluntary. Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U.S. 315, 328 (1889). So it was
held that a person compelled to stay in Germany during the war did not lose
his residence or domicle in the United States, Stadtmuller v. Miller, supra; an
immigrant who returned to Germany and became a Red Cross surgeon during
World War I was not an enemy within the meaning of Sections 2, and 9(a) of
the Act, Vowinckel v. First Federal Trust Co., 10 F. 2d 19 (9th Cir. 1926);
a naturalized citizen of Italian birth who went to Italy for his health and was
unable to return because of the war was not a resident of a designated enemy
country within the meaning of the Act as to permit seizure of his property by
the Alien Property Custodian, losephberg P. Markham, 152 F.2d 644 (2nd Cir.
1945) ; and a citizen of the United States in Germany during the war was not
of itself sufficient to make him an enemy within the meaning of Sections 2, and
9(a) of the Act. Sarthou v. Clark, 78 F. Supp. 139 (S.D. Cal. 1938). See
note 148 A.L.R. 1423 (1944).

Since the petitioner was detained involuntarily in Germany, he was not an
enemy within the meaning of Sec. 2 of the Act and, therefore, under Sec. 9(a) of
the Trading with the Enemy Act, supra, which authorizes a suit by any person
not an enemy to recover property vested in the Alien Property Custodian, petitioner could recover his property.
The next question was whether the petitioner was prohibited from recovering his property because of Sec. 39 of the Trading with the Enemy Act, supra,
which expressly forbids the return of any vested property to any national of
Germany and Japan. Two issues are involved in construing Sec. 39 of the Act:
(1) Whether, because of the legislative history of the Act, Congress intended
to construe Sec. 39 harmoniously with the other sections of the Act; (2) If
Sec. 39 is not to be construed harmoniously with the other sections of the Act,
whether this Sec. 39 would raise constitutional questions.
In regard to the first issue, after the passage of the Trading with the Enemy
Act in 1917, the interpretation of Sec. 2 of the Act represented a deliberate modification of Congressional power over enemy property. 55 Cong. Rec. 4842
(1917). This policy of modification culminated with the Settlement of War Act,

45 Stat. 252, 270, 274 (1928),

50 U.S.C. App. Sec. 9(b)12-14(9m)

(1946).

Congress provided for the return to enemy owners 80% of their vested property. The return of the German property was postponed when it appeared that
Germany was in default payment of war claims in 1934. 48 Stat. 1267 (1934).
But merely because the United States after World War I intended to deal justly
with former owners of seized property detracted nothing from the title acquired
by the United States in retaining or disposing of such property. Cummings v.
Deutsche Bank, 300 U.S. 115, 120 (1937).

In 1941 Congress extended power of seizure and vesting to all property of
any foreign country or national thereof in exercising its war powers. 55 Stat.
839 (1941), 50 U.S.C. App. Sec. 5(b) (1946). However, while Sec. 5(b)
extended the power of seizure, it did not limit or restrict the scope of Sec.
9(a) of the Act.
In 1946, Sec. 32 of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 60 Stat. 784 (1947),
50 U.S.C. App. Sec. 32 (Supp. 1948), was passed. It empowered the President
to make discretionary administrative returns of World War II vested enemy
property.
Before passage of Sec. 39 of the Act the terms "enemy alien", "enemy
national", "Japanese or German national" were used interchangeably without
regard to the precise meaning in the context of the Act. Hearings before a
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Judiciary on H.R. 4044, 80th Cong.,
2nd Sess. 124 (1948). However, the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce on H.R. Rep. No. 976, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. 2 (1947), reported
favorably on the bill. It stated that Congress intended to institute a policy of

non-return and non-compensation of enemy property. Such a policy did not
violate international law or morality because both private property of German and
Japanese nationals and public property of Germany and Japan were controlled
by their respective governments.
Sec. 39 of the Act was enacted as part of the War Claims Act of 1948, 62
Stat. 1246 (1948), 50 UIS.C.A. App. Sec. 39 (Supp. 1949). It provides for
compensation of the United States citizens who suffered during the last war
under the Germans and the Japanese. U.S. Code Cong. Service 2317 (1948).
Sec. 13(a) of the War Claims Act, 62 Stat. 1246 (1948), 50 U.S.C.A.
App. Sec. 2012 (Supp. 1949), provides that the source of funds of these claims
shall be received from German and Japanese vested property under Sec. 39 of
the Trading with the Enemy Act. Thus, Congress resolved "not to permit recurrence" of World War I policy of returning enemy property. H.R. Rep. No.
976, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1947).
In regard to the second issue, Congress has the power of confiscation of
enemy property under U.S. CONST. Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 11, without paying full
or adequate compensation. United States v. Chemical Foundation, 227 U.S. 1,
11 (1926) ; Stoehr v. Wallace, 225 U.S. 239 (1921) ; Central Union Trust Co.
v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554 (1920). However, when the United States expropriates
property of friendly nations the Fifth Amendment requires payment of just
compensation. Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481 (1931).
And as matter of interpretation of the Trading with the Enemy Act, a resident
enemy even though interned must be given access to the American courts. Ex
parte Kowato, 317 U.S. 69 (1942). On the other hand, the court in Techt v.
Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 128 N.E. 185 (1920), held that a national of an enemy
country wherever resident is an enemy alien and his right to sue is a matter of

grace. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the rationale of the Techt
case, supra, in Johnson v. Eisenstranger, 339 U.S. 763, 771-773 (1950). There
is "no constitutional prohibition against confiscation of enemy properties." United
States v. Chemical Foundation, supra. "There is no doubt but that under the war
powers, . . . the United States, may vest in itself the property of a -national of an
enemy nation." Silesian-American Corp. v. Clark, 332 U.S. 469, 475 (1947).
See, Lourie, 'Enemy' under the Trading with the Enemy Act and Some Problems
of International Law, 42 Mich. L. Rev. 383 (1943).
This brief legislative history of the Trading with the Enemy Act reveals a
change of Congressional policy from one of early relaxation by returning vested
enemy property, to one of stringent control by forbidding return of property to
even friendly nationals of enemy countries. This policy of confiscating property
of friendly nationals of enemy countries has sound justication under our Federal Constitution.
It is submited that the court erred in the principal case in interpreting Sec.
39 of the Act. Petitioner should have been barred from recovery because Sec.
39, under the correct interpretation, should have amended Sec 9(a) by adding
to the categories of enemies not only those who are under Sec. 2 but also those
who are nationals of enemy countries.
ANDREW CODISPOTI
LABOR LAW-LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT-FREE SPEECH PROVI-

SIONS-CONTRACTs.-The union and the petitioner had been engaged in contract
negotiations for a few days when the employees tiring of the delay threatened
to strike. Upon hearing this, the petitioner's president spoke to the employees.
He told them that he was alarmed by the talk of an impending strike; that there
was no occasion for the employees to strike and that while he was willing to
negotiate with the union, he would not sign a closed-shop contract, since he
believed it was unlawful. He said further:
• . . we would hate to see you quit, and if through some effort on the part
of a group of people you go out on what might be called a strike, we would
not consider it a strike, because there is nothing that you would be striking

against. We have no contract. You would be quitting your job, and if
you do we won't take you back. We will try to replace you as rapidly as

possible.

The threatened strike did not materialize.
The National Labor Relations Board issued an order directing the petitioner
to cease and desist from "threatening its employees that it would not rehire
them if they went out on strike" or otherwise coercing them from exercising their
right of self-organization under Sec. 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended by Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. §157 (1947) and
to post notice to that effect at its plant. From this order the petitioner appealed.
Collins Baking Co. v. N.L.R.B., 193 F. 2d 483 (5th Cir. 1951).
In upholding the Board's decision, the court determined the issue to be
whether or not the speech was purely persuasive argument, expressly sanctioned
by the 'free speech' amendment, §8 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended by Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. §158(c), or whether
in violation of §8 (a) (1) it amounted to interference, restraint, coercion of its
employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization secured to them by
§7 of the Act and was therefore an unfair labor practice.

One of the most galling aspects of the former National Labor Relations
Act to the employer was the restriction on being able to fully answer the union
arguments during organizing drives or to give their honest opinions. The feeling
of unfairness felt by the employer finally resulted in (c) being added to Section
8 of the 1947 Amendments to the Act.
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the
thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic or visual form, shall
or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the
expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of

dissemination
not constitute
Act, of such
benefit.

As a matter of fact the provision had little practical effect; for some time
previous to its enactment the Board had been permitting the employer to speak
to the employees on labor matters. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. 72 N. L. R. B.
132 (1947) ; Fisher Governor Co., 71 N. L. R. B. 1291 (1946). The utterances
are not unlawful as long as they involve no greater degree of interference and
coercion than would inevitably flow from any such speech considering the
employer's position and superior economic position. So the statutory provision
merely enacted the current practice and forbade the return to the former view.
The question whether a statement is coercive is one of fact. The test used
to determine the fact of coercion is known as the "totality of conduct" doctrine and
was set forth in the case of N. L. R. B. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314
U. S. 469 (1941). There the court held that although a bulletin posted by
the employer could not be found coercive in itself, it should be considered in
the light of the "whole complex of activities" for the purpose of determining
whether the utterances should be "raised ...to the status of coercion by reliance
on the surrounding circumstances".
Words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they have only a communal
existence; not only does the meaning of each interpenetrate the other, but
all in their aggregate take their purport from the setting in which they are
used, of which the relation of the speaker and the hearers is perhaps the
most important part. What to an outsider will be no more than the vigorous
presentation of a conviction, to the employee may be the manifestation of a
determination which it is not safe to thwart.
L. Hand, J. in National Labor Relations Board v. Federbush Company, 121 F.
2d 954, 957 (2nd Cir. 1941.)

The court in the instant case distinguished N. L. R. B. v. Sidran, 181 F.
2d 671 (10th Cir. 1950) saying that there the words were milder and free from
intimidating threats and were also said in less critical circumstances than the
present statement. Threats of discrimination are no less a violation of the rights
of employees secured by §7 of the Act than are acts of discrimination. D. H.
Holmes Co. v. N. L. R. B., 179 F. 2d 876 (5th Cir. 1950); N. L. R. B. v. Gate
City Cotton Mills, 167 F. 2d 647 (5th Cir. 1948).

An employer guilty of no unfair labor practice has a right to continue his
business and to protect it during an economic strike and is allowed to fill places
left vacant by the strike. In Kansas Milling Co. v. N. L. R. B., 185 F. 2d 413
(10th Cir. 1950), the employer warned employees already on strike that unless
they returned to work the company would have no alternative but to fill their jobs
and to deny them reinstatement after a named date. The court held that there
was no coercion and that the words were merely persuasive.
There is a crucial difference between an employer's addressing his employees
before they have started their threatened strike and addressing them after they
have gone out on strike. After they have gone out on strike there could be no
coercion, for contrary to the statement made by the employer in the instant

case, their action of striking does not terminate their status as employees. They
remain employees for the remedial purposes of the Act, and Sec. 8 of the Act
forbids an employer from disC.imination against his employees in favor of their
replacements at the termination of the strike. N. L. R. B. v. Mackey, 304 U. S.
333, 346 (1938); J. A. Bentley Lumber Co. zi. N. L. R. B., 180 F. 2d 641
(5th Cir. 1950).
The employer in stating that he would not sign a closed shop agreement
was on firm ground, and the mere execution of contract clauses providing for
dosed shops, preferential shops, union hiring halls, or referral systems violates
the Act, even if they are not enforced. Hager & Sons, 80 N. L. R. B. 163 (1948).
. One is left with the question of how really coercive the employer's action
was when the employees had threatened to strike within a week after a consent
election had selected the union as their bargaining agent.
HARRY BALFE, II

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-BANKS
-LEGALITY
OF BANK RELEASE FROM

AND CUSTOMERS-STOP-PAYMENT ORDER
LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT PAYMENT OF

STOPPED CHECK. Plaintiff, a depositor with the defendant bank, drew and
delivered to a third person a check on his account. Before presentment of the
check for payment, plaintiff orally and later by written request notified the
defendant to stop payment. The written request to stop payment contained a
clause which purported to release the bank if it paid the check through its
inadvertence, accident, or oversight. Subsequently the check was presented by the
third party and payment was made by the defendant through inadvertence.
Plaintiff's account was charged and when defendant refused to restore credit
to the plaintiff, this suit followed.
Held, judgment for plaintiff. Defendant bank paid at its peril when payment had been stopped. It is the legal duty of a bank to exercise reasonable
care not to pay a check upon which it has received adequate and reasonable
notice to stop payment and any release given by a depositor to a bank relieving
the bank for payments through inadvertence is without legal effect and void as
against public policy, even though drawn so as to import consideration. Thomas
v. First National Bank of Scranton, 20 U. S. L. Week 2370 (Feb. 26, 1952);
The Legal Intelligencer, Feb. 18, 1952, p. 1, col. 3.
It is well settled that a bank's relation to its depositor is that of debtor
and its obligation is to disburse in conformity with his order. Reinhardt v. PassaicClifton Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 84 A. 2d 741 (N. J. 1951). By the great
weight of authority, the drawer of a check retains right to countermand its payment at any time before it has paid or is certified and delivered to a bona fide
holder for value. Tremont Trust Co. v. Burack, 235 Mass. 398, 126 N. E. 782
(1920). At common law, drawee bank failing to stop payment of an uncertified
check on seasonable notice pays at its peril and is liable to the drawer. Gaita
v. Windsor Bank, 251 N. Y. 152, 167 N. E. 203, 204 (1929).

In view of this

common law liability, banks have often sought to restrict their liability by release
clauses. Reinhardt v. Passaic-Clifton Nat. Bank & Trust Co., supra at 743.
Whether a bank may exempt itself from liability for paying a check as
a result of inadvertence or accident, through a release clause contained in a
stop-payment order, is a question about which there is a split in judicial opinion.

The validity of these releases has been upheld in jurisdictions which admit
that the common law liability of a bank for paying a check or order in disregard
of the drawer's countermand may be limited by contract. In the leading case,
Gaita v. Windsor Bank, supra at 204, the court stated:
"The common law liability of a bank in regard to a specific transaction may
be limited provided the limitation has the assent of the depositor. In such
a situation the clearly expressed intention of the parties will prevail and the
rule of 'freedom of contract' will be enforced."

The court in Speroff v. First Cent. Trust Co., 149 Ohio St. 415, 79 N. E. 2d 119,
121 (1948), though deciding against the validity of such a release, announced that
some jurisdictions uphold the release as a valid contract supported by sufficient
consideration which springs from the mercantile relation of the parties and the
reciprocal rights and obligations which the law attaches to that relation. In
Tremont Trust Co. v. Burack, supra, the court upheld these releases against
the claim that they were opposed to public policy. Likewise, the court in
Hodnick v. Fidelity Trust Co., 96 Ind. App. 342, 183 N. E. 488 (1932) upheld
them as being based on a sufficient consideration. The furthest extension in
the validating of these releases is found in Edwards v. National City Bank of New
York, 150 Misc. 80, 629 N. Y. S. 637 (N. Y. Munic. Ct., 1934) where the court,
following the reasoning of the Gaita case, supra, did not hold the bank liable
for payment of a certified check after the giving of a stop-payment order containing a release clause against liability through inadvertence or oversight.
On the other hand, some authorities hold that these release clauses are
without consideration and are void against public policy. In Speroff v. First Central Trust Co., supra, and Hiroshima v. Bank of Italy, 78 Cal. App. 362, 248 Pac.
947 (1926), the courts held these release clauses were without supporting consideration, against public policy, and ineffective to relieve the bank from liability.
Chief Justice Maltbie in Calamita v. Tradesmen's Nat. Bank, 135 Conn. 326, 64
A. 2d 46 (1949) nullified the clause because of the absence of consideration
and declined to pass on any issue of public policy. Likewise, in the Reinhardt
case, supra, a New Jersey court decided against the release clause on the ground
of lack of consideration without any decision on the issue of public policy.
Pennsylvania, in. the principal case, outlaws the release clause on grounds of
public policy irrespective of whether the clause is so drawn as to import consideration. Under this view the common law absolute liability of a bank for
paying a check through inadvertence where a stop-order has issued, would attach.
It is submitted that these release clauses should be sustained when they
are couched in unequivocal terms, and are a part of a written notice to stop
payment of a check, to which the depositor legally assents. Thel express
intention of the parties should prevail and the principle of "freedom of contract"
announced in the Gaita case, supra, should be applied.
In most instances, the release clause, which is a part of the written notice
to stop-payment, recites an exemption from liability for payment, "through inadvertence, accident, or similar reason." 1 A. L. R. 2d 1155 (1948). Such a clause is
clear, unambiguots and susceptible of accurate meaning. Gaita v. Windsor Bank,
supra at 204. In Pyramid Musical Corp. v. Floral Park Bank, 268 App. Div. 783,
48 N. Y. S. 2d 866 (Sup. Ct., 1944), following the Gaita case, supra, the court in
upholding the release clause, stated, "The notice qualified the bank's common
law liability. It [bank] did not become legally liable in the absence of evidence
of willful disregard of the notice." Clearly, this is not a general exemption

from total liability for negligence, nor does it render the bank immune in all
circumstances for failing to observe stop-payment orders. Indeed, no bank could
obtain customers under such an agreement.
It should be further observed that the stop-order containing a release clause
requires the assent of the customers. Once the drawer assents and serves such
a qualified notice, the obligation of the bank is thereby limited and the bank
will not be liable to the drawer if the check is inadvertently paid. Gaita v. Windsor
Bank, supra. There the court further stated:
"If a drawer desires to hold a bank to its common law liability and impose
upon it the absolute duty of stopping payment of a check, the notice served
on the bank should be positive and unqualified. Then, if the bank does not

desire to assume the liability imposed by such a notice, it may cancel the
account and terminate its relationship with the depositor."
Since both parties are free to contract on whatever terms they deem proper
and suitable, a depositor may resort to the unconditional stop-payment order and
its attending absolute liability, but when he chooses to issue the stop-payment
order containing a release clause, no reasons of public policy or consideration
for a contract should discredit or invalidate such a qualified order which he
chose to issue and legally assented to. By selecting the stop-order with a release
clause the depositor permits a continuous administration of his checking account
and relieves himself of the burden of having his account cancelled which may
well be essential to stop payment of his check when liability is absolutely due
to the issuance of a stop-order. The bank itself is also free to more expeditiously
handle all checks, so important in our world of credit. It can exercise ordinary
care and be legally free, with responsibility attaching in instances of willful
disregard of such notice or flagrant business mismanagement.
The principal case fails to accord a more equal and equitable footing to
the bank in its relationship to the customer. It would resort to common law
absolute liability when the needs of both depositor and the greatly expanding
banking institution would be better served under these circumstances necessitating a limited liability.
WILLIAM B. KAMENJAR
TORTS - CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS. - Plaintiff fell and received injuries
because of defective curbing in front of a charitable institution. Suit was brought
against the City of Pittsburgh, which impleaded the charitable institution. The
lower court entered judgment for the plaintiff and granted the charitable institution's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. City of Pittsburgh
appealed.
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that, under the doctrine of immunity
of charitable organizations from tort liability, the charitable institution was not
liable over to the City of Pittsburgh.
DISSENT: The doctrine of immunity is not applicable because of the
statutory duty on the part of the charitable institution to maintain and keep
in repair its sidewalks. Bond v. City of Pittsburgh, 368 Pa. 404, 84 A. 2d 328
(1951).
Three theories have been promulgated under which charities have been
immunized from tort liability. The first and most generally accepted basis
for exemption is the trust fund theory. That doctrine was announced in Feoffees
of Heriot's Hospital v. Ross, 12 C. & F. 507, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1846), where
the court stated:

"There is a trust, and there are persons intended to manage it for the benefit
of those who are the object of the charity. To give damages out of a trust
fund would not be to apply it to those objects whom the author of the
fund had in view but would divert it to a completely different purpose."

The rule was made applicable in Gables v. Sisters of St. Francis, 227 Pa. 254,

75 Atl. 1087 (1910) where the plaintiff, a hospital patient, was badly burned
when a nurse inadvertently placed a hot water bottle in the plaintiff's bed.
The court denied recovery stating "that it is a doctrine too well established to
be shaken that a public charity cannot be made liable for the torts of its servants."
Another theory advanced by the courts granting nonliability is the implied
waiver doctrine; that is the beneficiary is deemed to have waived his right to
recovery for any injury sustained in the reception of a benefit from the institution. Powers v. Mass, Homeopathic Hospital, 109 Fed. 294 (1st Cir. 1901).
Another theory was advanced in Bodenheimer v. Confederate Memorial
Ass'n, 68 F. 2d 507 (4th Cir. 1934), where a plaintiff beneficiary was injured
in a fall caused by the defective condition of the sidewalk. There the Court
held that public policy is the rationale of the decisions sustaining immunity:
A policy of the law which prevents him who accepts the benefit of a charity
from suing it for the torts of its agents and servants, and thus taking for
his private use the funds which have been given for the benefit of humanity,
which shields gifts made to charity from "the hungry maw of litigation"
and conserves them for the purposes of the highest importance to the state,

carries on its face its own justification, and wihout the aid of metaphysical
reasoning, commends itself to the wisdom of mankind.

The leading case which broke the established doctrine of immunity was
President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 76 App. D. C. 123,
130 F. 2d 810 (1942). In that case the plaintiff was allowed to recover from
the defendant on the theory that charities are liable for negligence the same
as other persons and corporations. In Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Vt.,
70 A. 2d 230 (Vt. 1950) the plaintiff was injured in a fall on some ice that
had formed on the sidewalk. The court held that a private institution conducted solely for charitable purposes is not by that fact exempt from liability
for an injury occasioned by its negligence. The court further declared that the
defendant could also be liable for maintaining a public nuisance if a proper case
were presented.
The theory of immunity from liability for charitable institutions has been
subjected to various modifications. Some states have modified the doctrine of
complete immunity and impose liability if the person harmed is a stranger to
the charity. Cohen v. Gen. Hospital Society of Conn., 113 Conn. 188, 154 Ati.
435 (1931). Other jurisdictions have extended the liability still further to
protect paying beneficiaries of the institution as well as strangers. Silva v.
Providence Hospital, 14 Cal. 2d 762, 97 P. 2d 798 (1939). And, finally,
several states have granted recovery without distinction between strangers and
beneficiaries. Barwege v. City of Owatonna, 190 Minn. 374, 251 N. W. 915
(1933).

The dissent in the principal case is in harmony with the almost universal
criticism of the accepted rule and the basis upon which the rule is justified.
Both the trust fund theory and the implied waiver theory have been shown to
be without factual foundation. Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Vt., supra.

The third rationale of immunity, the public policy argument, is certainly not
applicable to a large, impersonal, charitable organization of today.
It is submitted that the doctrine of absolute immunity from tort liability
attaching to a charitable institution should yield in special circumsances, particularly in situations, like the principal case, where an institution has a statutory
duty to maintain and repair sidewalks.
DONALD J. LETIZIA

TORTS-FEDERAL

TORT

CLAIMS

ACT-RECOVERY

BY

MEMBERS

OF

THE

ARMED FORCES.-This was an action brought in the United States District Court
for the District of Massachusetts to recover damages for injury to plaintiff's
personal property. This action was brought under the provisions of the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 28 U. S. C. sec. 2671, et seq. (Supp. 1951). The plaintiff was
an Ensign in the United States Naval Reserve. He was ordered to active duty
for fourteen day training. Plaintiff, while on active duty parked his car in a
designated parking area. Following completion of a training flight plaintiff
returned to the parking area to pick up his car. He found his car pitted and
dented. The only explanation for the damage was that someone was negligent
in starting an airplane in the airplane parking area, resulting in stones and sand
being thrown against the plaintiff's car. The defendant, the United States
government argued that the action should be dismissed under the doctrine laid
down in the case of Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135 (1950), that servicemen, while on active duty, cannot recover for injuries arising out of or incident
to service. The District Court, however, held for the plaintiff, Lund v. United
States, Civil No. 50-259, D. Mass., February 5, 1952.
This case represents another step in clarifying the problem of under what
circumstances members of the armed forces may sue under the Federal Tort
Claims Act.
The first case of importance brought by a member of the armed forces
under the Federal Tort Claims Act was the case of Brooks v. United States, 337
U. S. 49 (1949). This was a case where a soldier, while on furlough, was
injured by a government truck. The court allowed him to recover under the
provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act. The reasoning of the court in
the Brooks case was that the injury did not arise out of or in the course of military duty; therefore, it did not come within the specific exceptions, applicable
to members of the armed forces, as found in the Federal Tort Claims Act, supra,
sec. 421.
The next case which determined who in the armed services could sue the
government under the Tort Claims Act, was the case of Feres v. United States,
supra. This was a case where decedent perished in a fire in an Army barracks.
Negligence was alleged in quartering him in barracks that should have been
known to be unsafe. The court denied the claim of the decedent's executrix.
The reasoning of the court in this case was that the decedent was on active
duty; therefore, Congress had provided him with a "simple, certain, and uniform compensation for injuries or death". Id. at p. 144.
The court distinguishes the Feres case from the Brooks case, in that in the
former the injury was incident to service, while, in the latter, injury was not

incident to service. The reasoning in the Feres case was applied in a recent
case in the District of Columbia, Lewis v. United States, 190 Fed. 22 (D. C.
Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U. S. 869 (1951).
A U. S. Park Policeman, while on active duty, was injured as a result of
the negligence of a fellow officer, the injured officer was denied recovery under
the Federal Tort Claims Act, even though he did not come within the provisions of the Federal Employees Compensation Act. 5 U. S. Code §751 (1946).
Federal employees covered by this Act, are not permitted to sue under the Tort
Claims Act, 28 U. S. Code §2671 et seq., (Supp. 1951). The injured Park
Policeman was compensated through a uniform system of compensation provided for Metropolitan policemen.
Finally, we come to the Lund case, supra, where the court has permitted a
serviceman on active duty to recover damages for injury to his personal property
under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The court's reasoning in the case under
consideration was that driving his car to the airbase was not incident to his
service. Therefore, recovery should be allowed. At the present stage of development of case law interpreting the Federal Tort Claims Act, it appears that
a member of the armed services, while on active duty, may recover for injury
to his personal property when injury is not directly incident to the service;
and may recover for personal injuries not directly incident to military service,
but not for injuries incident to service.
JOHN M. LOTHSCHUETZ

TRADE REGULATION-MONOPOLY-RESTRAINT

OF ATTEMPTED ADVERTISING

2 OF SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST ACT. Appellants had
published a daily newspaper in Lorain, Ohio since before 1932. In that year,
they bought out their only competitor and, at the time of this suit, dominated
the field, reaching 99 percent of Lorain families. The journal published state,
national and international news and handled both local and national advertising.
This domination of local advertising channels was threatened in 1948 by establishment of radio station WEOL by the Elyria-Lorain Broadcasting Company
in Elyria, eight miles from Lorain, with a branch station in Lorain. The station
carried state and out-of-state news and advertising, and most of its income came
from broadcasting paid advertisements. The fact that the station was engaged
in interstate activity is shown by evidence that its broadcasts were regularly
heard by persons as far removed as southeast Michigan.
To meet the competition offered by the station, the journal refused to
accept local advertising from anyone who advertised, or who planned to advertise, over WEOL. Many advertisers desired to use both media, and for some,
use of the newspaper was essential.
In an equity action brought under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U. S. C.
§ 1 and 2 (1946), the United States sought to have Lorain Journal Company
and its principal officers enjoined from continuing their attempt to monopolize
local advertising channels. The Government was successful in the District Court,
United States v. Lorain Journal Company, 92 F. Supp. 794 (N. D. Ohio 1950),
and the defendants appealed.
MONOPOLY UNDER SECTION

The United States Supreme Court unanimously affirmed that decision, holding appellants guilty of violati-ng section 2 of the Act and enjoined the continuance of their unlawful activities. Section 2 provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $5,000, or by imprison-

ment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of
the court. 26 Stat. 209, 15 U. S. C. A. § 2.

Section 4 vests jurisdiction of such suits in the District Courts of the United
States.
The United States Supreme Court held that local distribution of news was
an inseparable part of the flow of interstate commerce, as were the broadcasting
activities of station WEOL.
Appellants' asserted rights of freedom to select their customers and freedom
of the ress, guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution, were
conceded, but the court pointed out that the exercises of those rights is subject
to curtailment when the free flow of interstate commerce is threatened. Lorain
Journal Company v. United States, 342 U. S. 143 (1951).
Dissemination of news and advertising through a newspaper constitutes
interstate commerce. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U. S. 1 (1945). It
is equally clear that station WEOL was engaged in interstate commerce. "By its
very nature, broadcasting transcends State lines and is national in its scope
and importance--characteristics which bring it within the purpose and protection,
and supject to the control, of the commerce clause." Fisher's Blend Station v.
State Tax Commission, 297 U. S. 650, 655 (1936). With interstate commerce
involved, the Journal's activities came within the range of federal control.
Earlier, the United States Supreme Court clarified the limitation imposed
upon the right to choose one's customers by stating that right may be freely
exercised "in the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly."
United States v. Colgate & Company, 250 U. S.300, 307 (1919). This principle
was reiterated in United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Company, 321 U. S.
707 (1944) and in Associated Press v,. United States, supra.
Associated Press v. United States, supra, offers an analogous situation, on a
larger scale. Associated Press dealt in the gathering and distribution of interstate and foreign news. By means of its by-laws, it forbade furnishing of its
product to non-members and enabled members to prevent others from joining
the association. The Government proceeded against Associated Press under section
2 of the Sherman Act, and the Supreme Court enjoined continuance of these
monopolistic practices, holding that an attempt to monopolize interstate commerce was involved and the fact that competitors had not been completely
excluded did not prevent granting of an injunction. In response to Associated
Press' allegation that freedom of the press was denied, the court said: "Freedom
to publish means freedom for all and not for some. Freedom to publish is
guaranteed by the Constitution, but freedom to combine to keep others from
publishing is not. Freedom of the press from governmental interference under
the First Amendment does not sanction repression of that freedom by private
interests." Ibid at p. 20.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act is broad, covering not only a monopoly or
attempt to monopolize individually, but also a conspiracy with others to monopolize "any part" of interstate or foreign commerce. (Section 1 deals only with

restraints of trade.) There has been much dispute as to the intent and actions
necessary to constitute such an attempt or conspiracy to monoplize, and the
essential elements which must exist before the court will strike down a business
as a monopoly.
Total exclusion of competitors is not necessary to constitute a monopoly
in violation of the Act. American Tobacco Company v. United States, 328 U. S.
781 (1946); Associated Press v. United States, supra. The intent to monopolize, in conjunction with a definite probability that a monopoly will be established,
has been held sufficient to warrant granting of an injunction under the Sherman
Act. Swift & Company v. United States, 196 U. S. 375 (1905). A specific
intent to monopolize trade is not necessary. It is enough if one's activities result
in establishment of a power to monopolize. The mere possession of a power
to monopolize, however acquired, and even if it is unused, is condemned. United
States v. Griffith, 334 U. S. 100 (1947). A lawfully acquired monopoly power
becomes illegal when used to prevent competition or destroy competitors. American Federation of Tobacco Growers v. Neal, 183 F. 2d 869 (4th Cir. 1950)
presented a situation where the Danville, Virginia tobacco board of trade possessed, under a State statute, control of selling of tobacco in the Danville market.
The members of plaintiff, and tobacco farmers' cooperative association, were denied
access to the market because of their advantage over Danville competitors in
costs and taxes resulting from their location outside the city. The court granted
damages and an injunction under the Sherman Act against this exclusion from
the market, saying that the restraint was an unreasonable one and that this use
of monopoly power by the board of trade to prevent competition, even though
lawfully acquired, was illegal.
The extent to which one controls the market bears a definite weight in
determining whether a monopoly exists. In United States v. Besser Manufacturing
Company, 96 F. Supp. 304 (E. D. Mich. 1951), the District Court held that
where two corporations controlled 65 percent of the total United States business
of manufacturing concrete block machinery, the other 35 percent being divided
among more than 50 other manufacturers and the strongest competitor controlling less than 8 percent of the total, there was strong evidence that they
held a monopoly. Such a monopoly can be deterred before it reaches 100 percent
control. Any combination of former or potential competitors which approaches
complete control of any industry will be viewed with suspicion. United States
v. Gypsum Company, 340 U. S. 76 (1950).
Section 2 of the Sherman Act condemns monopolizing "any part" of interstate or foreign commerce. The words, "any part", have been interpreted to
mean any appreciable amount of that commerce. Clearly, in the Besser and United
States Gypsum cases, supra, the control in each case was substantial enough to
leave no doubt that it came within the purview of the Act. United States v.
Yellow Cab Company, 332 U. S. 218 (1946), presents a factual situation almost
as clear on the point of extent of control sufficient to be called a monopoly. There,
the defendents were found guilty of conspiring to monopolize the sale of vehicles
to be used as taxicabs in Chicago, Pittsburgh, New York and Minneapolis and
the furnishing of taxi service in Chicago. Markin, a defendant, controlling
Checker Cab Manufacturing Corporation, planned with others to merge the
principal cab operating companies in several large cities. The defendants organized Parmelee Transportation Company which alone took over the business of
transporting passengers between railroad stations in Chicago under exclusive
contracts with the railroad companies. Parmelee acquired a controlling interest

in Chicago Yellow Cab Company, Inc., which company held 53 percent of the
outstanding cab licenses in Chicago. Parmelee then acquired 100 percent of
the total licenses in use in Pittsburgh, 58 percent in Minneapolis and 15 percent
in New York City. The United States Supreme Court held that there was an
unlawful conspiracy to monopolize this business and that the amount of interstate commerce affected was an "appreciable amount", sufficient for the activities
to be stricken down under section 2 of the Sherman Act. In a recent case involving a similar situation, United States v. National City Lines, 186 F. 2d 562
(7th Cir. 1951), cert. den. 341 U. S. 916 (1951), defendants, transit line
holding companies and their suppliers, were found guilty of conspiring to
monopolize interstate commerce, the court holding that they violated the Sherman
Act when they conspired to control all busses and supplies for busses used in
public transportation in forty-five cities of the United States. This was sufficient
to constitute monopolizing of an appreciable part of interstate commerce.
The principal case serves to dispel the idea that the Sherman Anti- Trust Act
is designed or used only as a weapon against monopoly practiced by large enterprises. Any enter prise, the activities of which involve interstate commerce, even
though small and concerned primarily with local affairs, is subject to federal
regulation when it attempts to estblish a monopoly or exert an existing monopoly
power. The Sherman Act is concerned with more than the large, nation-wide
obstacles to interstate trade. "The source of the restraint may be interstate, as
the making of a contract or combination usually is; the application of the restraint may be interstate, as it often is; but neither matters if the necessary effect
is to stifle or restrain commerce among the States." United States v. Women's
Sportswear Manufacturers Association, 336 U. S.460, 464 (1948). Congress
may regulate even intrastate activities under the Sherman Act if they have any
substantial effect on interstate commerce. Myers v. Shell Oil Company, 96 F.
Supp. 670 (S.D. Cal. 1951).
The Sherman Act cannot be used as a remedy for all local barriers to trade,
but the fact situation in the principal case is within its scope because the restraint
attempted by the Lorain Journal threatened business which was essentially interstate in nature. The Sherman Act can be used to dispose of any restrictive
practices, of a local nature, which threaten in any substantial way to impede the
free flow of interstate commerce.
BETTY ROSS

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-MALPRACTICE-RIGHT OF EMPLOYEE TO
SUE PHYSICIAN AFTER ACCEPTANCE OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AWARD-Plaintiff, employee of the Virginia Electric and Power
DOUBLE RECOVERY.

Company, brought action against defendant physican for malpractice, alleging
aggravation in treating plaintiff's injuries received in the course of his employment. Defendant denied any right of action on the ground that plaintiff had
already been compensated by his employer for both the original injury and the
aggravation under the provisions of the Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act.
Plaintiff replied that the employer-employee settlement did not include all of the
elements of damage, such as pain, anguish, bodily disfigurement, loss of full
wages, and other benefits, for the defendant as a third party tortfeasor was
liable. The court dismissed plaintiff's action.

Held, an appeal, judgment reversed. Payment for injuries under the Virginia
Workmen's Compensation Act does not protect third party tortfeasors, bit only
the employer from any action by his employee. Although the employee has
received his statutory compensation, he is not prevented from proceeding against
the physician for actual damages arising from the aggravation. Fauver v. Bell,
192 Va. 518, 65 S. E. 2d 575 (1951).
Whether or not an employee may sue a physician for actual damages resulting from malpractice after having been compensated by his employer, under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, for both the original injury and the aggravation,
has been a subject of much judicial conflict.
Under the common law, an employer who selected a skillful physican to
treat his injuried employee was not liable for a subsequent malpractice committed
by the physician. Atcheson, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Zeiler, 54 Kan. 340, 38 Pac.
282 (1894). The original tortfeasor was liable for both the injury and its
aggravation. Wallace v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 222 Pa. 556, 71 Atl. 1086 (1909).
The physican was liable for the aggravation and its consequences. Pike v. Honsinger, 155 N. Y. 201, 49 N. E. 760 (1898). In order to prevent a double recovery,
if the injured person recovered from the original tortfeasor for both the original
injury and its aggravation, the latter became subrogated to the former's rights
against the physican. Fisher v. Milwaukee Ry. & Light Co., 173 Wis. 57, 180
N. W. 269 (1920). The overwhelming weight of authority at common law
gave the injured person a separate cause of action against the original tortfeasor
and the physician, since they were considered severally liable. Viau v. BrooksScanlon Lumber Co., 99 Minn. 97, 108 N. W. 891 (1906).
The Workmen's Compensation Acts changed the common law and hold the
employer liable for his employees' injuries arising out of the course of employment, irrespective of who may be the orignal tortfeasor. Mulhall v. Nashua Mfg.
Co., 80 N. H. 194, 115 Atl. 449 (1921). The employee is usually compensated
by his employer for both the original injury and any aggravation thereof, but
only on a statutory level of recovery which falls below the employee's actual
damages. Pawlak v. Hayes, 162 Wis. 503, 156 N. W. 464 (1916); Phillips v.
Holmes Express Co., 229 N. Y. 527, 129 N. E. 901 (1920).
May the employee sue the physican for the actual damages arising from
the aggravation, after having been partially compensated for it by his employer?
The answer lies in each state's interpretation of its particular Workmen's Act as
well as each court's approach to the subject.
Since the employee at common law was usually allowed a malpractice action
against the physician-an action independent of the one against the original
tortfeasor, Viau v. Brooks-Scanlon Lumber Co., supra-this right can be denied
him only if it is abrogated by statute.
A few states, however, hold that the malpractice is part of the original
injury and, as such, compensable exclusively under the Act. Burns v. Vilardo, 26
N. J. Misc. 277, 60 A. 2d 94 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Roman v. Smith, 42 F. 2d 931
(D. Idaho 1930); Ross v. Erickson Const. Co., 89 Wash. 634, 155 Pac. 153
(1916). This harsh result, which follows the common law minority rule, is
reached by looking at the overall purpose of the Act as one primarily intended
to remove from the courts multiple personal injury actions by employees. Ross
v. Erickson Const. Co., supra.
The majority of the states limit the abrogating effect of the Act only to actions
against the employer. Huntoon v. Pritchard,371 11. 36, 20 N. E. 2d 53 (1939).
Most of them allow an action against the physician either because a third party

